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1. Introduction
In the course of this paper it is my intention to press the argument that Van
Eemeren and Grootendorst's presentation and general characterisation of
their pragma-dialectical rules for argumentation along tightly construed
pragmatic lines paints a misleading picture with respect to their second
pragma-dialectical rule. This rule simply states that: "Whoever advances a
standpoint is obligated to defend it if asked to do so".(Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 1988a: 281). This particular probative obligation on the part of a
speaker is also commonly referred to as the burden of proof. My concern is
that the casual reader on this subject can be left with the impression that the
notion of the burden of proof is merely part of a pragmatic apparatus geared
specifically to "resolving disputes". What I want to propose is that this notion
has deeper normative roots than a pragma-dialectical treatment of the subject
would have us believe.
In order to make this proposal plausible I want to employ a simple three-part
strategy. First, I want to take some time to review Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst's stance with regard to their pragma-dialectical rules where a
tightly focused pragmatic emphasis appears to be their overarching theme.
Second, I want to voice some reservations that I have with this stance as it
relates to the second pragma-dialectical rule which speaks to the subject of the
burden of proof and lay out a rudimentary case for the existence of a more
commonplace or universal burden of proof. Third, in hopes of fleshing out this
rudimentary case I want to introduce for consideration Jurgen Habermas'
theory of communicative action. If Habermas' account has anything to
contribute to this dialogue on the burden of proof, and I am inclined to think it
does, then it offers a viable alternative perspective that challenges Van
Eemeren and Grootendorst's account.
2. The "Pragma" Dialectical Rules for Argumentation.
Before I begin I should put my methodological cards on the table, so to speak.
In interpreting Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's comments on the subject I
have adopted the simple prima facie rule of taking Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst's comments on their pragma-dialectical rules in general to apply
a fortiori to their second pragma-dialectical rule unless anything is presented
that would suggest specifically that this particular rule should be treated in an
exceptional manner. That being said, I want to turn the reader's immediate
attention to some of the statements that Van Eemeren and Grootendorst make
throughout their writings which set the stage for an assessment of just how they
intend their pragma-dialectical rules to be understood.
In their 1984 work Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions Van Eemeren
and Grootendorst assert the following statement of purpose:
We have therefore made it [our] statement of purpose to draw up a
code of conduct for rational discussants. The practical value of the
rules to be proposed depends on the degree to which they further
the resolution of disputes. (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984:
151).
They then go on shortly after to add:
The rules formulated in this chapter are designed to further the
resolution of disputes about expressed opinions by means of
argumentative discussions. In other words, they are intended to
enable language users to conduct themselves as rational
discussants, and they are also calculated to prevent anything that
might hinder or obstruct the resolution of a dispute. (Van Eemeren
and Grootendorst 1984: 151).
These comments, I submit, set the general theme concerning how the pragma-
dialectical rules are to be understood. It is a goal-oriented picture of rule utility
that also suggests why such rules should be considered normative for
participants in argumentation. However, pragmatic considerations are not the
only feature of the pragma-dialectical rules which renders them normative for
parties engaged in reasonable argumentation. In their 1988 article 'Rules for
Argumentation in Dialogues' Van Eemeren and Grootendorst state that "the
argumentation rules form an adequate procedure for resolving disputes which
is intersubjectively valid for discussants wishing to solve their disputes (Van
Eemeren and Grootendorst 1988b: 508). In fact, this additional feature of the
pragma-dialectical rules contributes to the adoption of Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst's "two part criterion" for the reasonable resolution of disputes;
namely, that of problem solving validity and conventional validity1. In this
context these parts are explicated along the following lines:
This means that the discussion and argumentation rules which
together form the procedure put forward in dialectical
argumentation theory, should on one hand be checked for their
adequacy regarding the resolution of disputes, and on the other for
their intersubjective acceptability for the discussants. With regard
to argumentation this means that soundness should be measured
against the degree to which the argumentation can contribute
towards the resolution of the dispute, as well as against the degree
to which it is acceptable to the discussants who wish to resolve the
dispute. (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1988a: 280).
These paired senses of validity and a sense of exactly how they are to be
taken are explicated later on in the same commentary with the following
affirmation:
The claim of acceptability which we attribute to these rules is not
based in any way on metaphysical necessity, but on their suitability
to do the job for which they are intended: the resolution of disputes.
The rules do not derive their acceptability from some external
source of personal authority or sacrosanct origin. Their
acceptability should rest on their effectiveness when applied.
Because the rules were developed exactly for the purpose of
resolving disputes, they should in principle be optimally acceptable
to those whose first and foremost aim is to resolve a dispute. This
means that the rationale for accepting these dialectical rules as
conventionally valid, is philosophically speaking, pragmatic.
Pragmatists judge the acceptability of rules on the extent to which
they appear successful in solving the problems they wish to solve.
In fact, to them a rule is a rule only if it performs a function in the
achievement of objectives set by the pragmatist. (Van Eemeren
and Grootendorst 1988a: 285).
This, as clearly as any statement offered by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst,
appears to encapsulate the general attitude that we are encouraged to adopt
with respect to the pragma-dialectical rules. These rules are normative simply
because they "do the job for which they are intended" and (as we have seen)
the specific job for which they are intended is the resolution of disputes. Add to
this the suggestion that in order for the pragma-dialectical rules to even be
seen as rules per se they must be intersubjectively ratified among the
participants and the picture of how we ought to receive Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst's pragma-dialectical rules is more or less complete.
3. Some Reservations
Since Van Eemeren and Grootendorst identify the probative obligation
contained in their second pragma-dialectical rule with the notion of the burden
of proof my particular interest in this subject leads me to ask, what do these
comments tell us about the notion of the burden of proof? At first glance, the
upshot of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's pragmatic approach to
argumentation norms appears to be that the burden of proof is something that
speaker's must satisfy in order to resolve a dispute in a reasonable fashion. If
this particular theme is where Van Eemeren and Grootendorst make their
stand on the subject, then I find nothing in this that is objectionable. But I don't
think this is where Van Eemeren and Grootendorst rest their case.
Their firm anti metaphysical position on the pragma-dialectical rules, their
eschewing of any authoritative necessity with respect to the same and their
emphasis on the pragmatic validity of their rules with respect to their specific
ability to resolve disputes would seem to imply a strong particularist stance
regarding their normativity. The implied message seems to be that the
pragma-dialectical rules (and a fortiori the burden of proof) are normative to
the extent that these rules give speakers the capacity to facilitate the
resolution of disputes insofar as speakers are interested in achieving this
particular goal.
Even if we grant that disputational or argumentative discourse is vastly
representative of the cases where the burden of proof is a conspicuous issue, I
would contend that there is a case to be made for the existence of a more
commonplace burden of proof that is not restricted to the domain of
argumentation and not necessarily oriented to the resolution of polemical
differences. In an effort to flesh out this suggestion let me introduce the
hypothetical example of a high school guidance councilor who is advising a
student on which university to go to. Suppose further that the choices, for one
reason or another, have been narrowed down to two alternatives. The student
asks the guidance councilor which is the better university, U. of A. or U. of B.
The councilor replies that the U. of A is the better of the two. The student then
asks, understandably, the obvious question, why? At this point I don’t think it
entirely untoward to ask, does the councilor have an obligation to substantiate
his or her assertion that A is superior to B?
My own intuition leads me to suggest that the answer is, yes. I think there is a
probative obligation to be met here and that this obligation has emerged in a
context that could only be construed as disputational or argumentational by an
overreaching extension of these notions. Not every request for grounds or
substantiation of a speaker's statements has to be construed as a dispute or a
segue to a dispute. Now unless this hypothetical example can be rendered
exotic, I think it suggests the possibility, if not plausibility, of a burden of proof
that exists outside of argumentational discourse. It also leaves us with a
question. On what basis is this burden of proof obligatory?
Perhaps as a means of getting to an answer to this we could push this
hypothetical case just a little. Suppose that the exchange goes as mentioned
above and that after being asked by the student to substantiate his or her
assertion of A's superiority over B the councilor does not do so. How should
our hypothetical student construe such a refusal? On the one hand, the
temptation is toward inferring that by not discharging the burden of proof the
councilor has reasons but is not inclined to present them. On the other hand, if
the councilor gave the student absolutely no reason to suspect that reasons of
any kind were being withheld then the student is faced with another possibility;
namely, that the councilor may not be making sense.
In fact, the more chronic the disengagement, the more I would be inclined to
opt for this explanation. In fact I don't think it would be too overreaching to
suggest that analogous cases of chronic disengagement on the part of a
speaker are, more often than not, taken as a sign that the speaker has lost,
forfeited or never acquired the ability to speak competently and generate
meaningful expressions. Linguistic competency and the ability to generate
meaningful expressions requires a distinct degree of second level ability on the
part of a speaker to recognise and respond to queries and possible queries
from others in the domain of discourse. In short, speakers are responsible for
discharging this commonplace burden of proof to the extent that they wish to
be regarded as competent speakers per se.
This is where I think the normative basis for what I have called the
commonplace burden of proof lies. It also suggests why this burden of proof
could rightly be equally called a universal burden of proof. Speakers are
required to meet this commonplace burden of proof in order to function as
competent communicators. The refusal to meet this commonplace burden
results in a breakdown in communication, since the inability to meet this
commonplace burden is, as likely as not, attributed to the inability to
communicate per se. The sense of universality comes in when we reflect on the
virtual impossibility of withdrawing or exempting oneself from communicative
activity entirely.
I think this universal burden of proof stands separate and apart from Van
Eemeren and Grootendorst's account and calls into question its claim to speak
about what renders the burden of proof normative. Because of its dedicated
commitment to the goal of dispute resolution, the pragma-dialectical account is
at somewhat of a loss to account for proof burdens outside of its chosen
scope. On the other hand, the universal burden of proof does appear to have
some insight to contribute to the pragma-dialectical account. We are informed
that the second pragma-dialectical rule is normative to the extent that it
facilitates the resolution of disputes. Just how does following this rule serve to
facilitate the resolution of disputes? If we take our cue from the universal
burden of proof we are in a position to suggest that the mere ability on the part
of a speaker to take up the burden of proof is tantamount to the capacity to
speak intelligibly and meaningfully. In addition we can suggest that a speaker's
willingness to take up the burden of proof is tantamount to the capacity to
communicate in a co-operative fashion.
Perhaps at this point it might be helpful if I take a run at placing some of this in
perspective by introducing a distinction Van Eemeren and Grootendorst make
regarding categories of rules for language use. Under their scheme there are:
(1) Syntactic rules for the production and interpretation of
sentences and larger stretches of discourse.
(2) Semantic rules concerning the meaning of the words and
expressions which are used in these sentences and larger
stretches of discourse.
(3) Communicative rules for a recognisable and correct
performance of the elementary and complex speech acts which are
carried out in these sentences and larger stretches of discourse.
(4) Interactional rules for an orderly and smooth conduct of the
dialogues, conversations or other forms of (spoken or written)
discourse constituted by the sequences of speech acts which are
carried out in these sentences and larger stretches of discourse.
(Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1988b: 500).
Their take on these categories is as follows:
The categories of syntactic and semantic rules (1 and 2) refer to
grammatical rules, the categories of communicative and
interactional rules (3 and 4) to pragmatic rules. If language users
fail to observe the grammatical rules, they exclude themselves from
the language community; if they fail to observe the pragmatic rules,
they exclude themselves from the communicative community. (Van
Eemeren and Grootendorst 1988b: 500).
Because Van Eemeren and Grootendorst regard argumentation as a speech
act complex, the failure to observe the second pragma-dialectical rule would
seem to fall into the second half of this division between the grammatical and
the pragmatic categories. My argument, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst might
argue, fails to recognise this distinction and attempts to paint a pragmatic rule
as a grammatical one. I think this objection has weight provided these
categories and the sub categories (grammatical vs. pragmatic) that Van
Eemeren and Grootendorst propose are not questioned. As my thought
experiment was intended to show, failure at the communicative level can also
raise the possibility of exclusion from the language community. Consequently, I
am inclined (depending on the circumstances) to regard the failure to perform
an elementary speech act as more of a grammatical failing than a pragmatic
one. Naturally this assessment is from a non-particularist view. In any particular
situation the failure to perform an elementary speech act can have a myriad of
results. But all of these results will be derivative upon this universal requirement
for competent communication.
In short, my position assumes a tighter relation between the semantic and
communicative categories than that proposed by Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst and that the boundary between what Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst call the grammatical and the pragmatic is much more permeable
than their account would suggest. I am also inclined to see what they call the
semantic, communicative and interactional rules as parts of a single continuum
of language competency the parts of which shade off into each other like the
colours of a spectrum. At the very least, such a perspective appears to leave
some room for the suggestion that what makes the burden of proof rule
normative runs deeper than any description oriented toward a particular
pragmatic concern.
In an effort, to flesh out this suggestion I want to end this paper by introducing
some ideas on communication advanced by Jurgen Habermas. What makes
Habermas' comments on this subject particularly applicable in this particular
context is his rejection of the usual analytic break between what Van Eemeren
and Grootendorst have called the semantic and the communicative. In the
section to follow I want to quickly cover Habermas’ critique of meaning theory
which dismisses reference semantics and truth conditional semantics in the
standard sense in favour of a more flexible condition which serves as a
prerequisite for understanding a speaker’s utterances. From there I want to
move on to Habermas’ understanding of communicative action and the role
played by "validity claims" where, I believe, the key to dealing with the burden
of proof notion lies.
4. Habermas on Meaning Theory
In his essay "Toward A Critique of the Theory of Meaning" Jurgen Habermas
carefully outlines where he sees himself moving within the domain of the
philosophy of language. Taking Karl Buhler’s schema of language functions as
a point de depart he views language as serving three simultaneous functions
when it is employed "communicatively".2 It serves to "express the intentions (or
subjective experiences (Erlebnisse)) of a speaker, to represent states of
affairs (or something the speaker encounters in the world), and to establish
relations with an addressee." Or to use Habermas’ more succinct formulation:
"The three aspects of a speaker reaching understanding / with another person
/ about something are reflected here" (Habermas 1998: 277).
Habermas finds this important because from his lights he sees the
historiography of the philosophy of language as falling into three schools
depending on which of these tripartite aspects of language one chooses to
emphasise. Intentionalist semantics stresses the speaker’s subjective intent,
formal semantics focuses on the truth conditions of a sentence and the use
theory of meaning focuses on the ambient social practises that inform the
activity of linguistic exchange or language games. Each of these appears to
attach to one of the aspects in Buhler’s tripartite model of language function
and press this to its limit.
Although Habermas is even handed in revealing the shortcomings of all of
these approaches, I want to concentrate on his comments regarding formal
semantics. Under this programme meaning is derived from the "formal
properties of sentences themselves and the rules whereby they are
constituted." (Habermas 1998: 280). Sentences and their propositional content
are examined in abstraction to determine how they serve their signifying
function. This bracketing out of the intentional and social dimensions of
language is achieved, Habermas wryly remarks, at the cost of "limiting its
analysis to the representational function of language." (Habermas 1998: 280).
Once this methodological path is taken toward the representational function of
language "the relationship between language and the world, between an
assertoric sentence and a state of affairs, moves to the centre of analysis."
(Habermas 1998: 281). Reference semantics, which sees the relationship
between language and the world as analogous to the relationship between a
name and its object is critiqued by Habermas as too uncomplicated to account
for the fact that a name can "stand for an object" and yet be placed within a
sentence which does not serve the function of "standing for an object".
(Habermas 1998: 281).
This gives Habermas room to move on to the idea that the representational
function of language must be explained along broader lines. It is facts that are
represented by language, or to put it another way, states of affairs are what
make assertoric sentences true. The elegance of this view is that in its purest
expression it can take the analytical highroad and suggest that such facts (or
truth conditions under which they can be determined to hold) can be articulated
without reference to any particular speaker. It is a formal analysis in the most
rigorous and elegant sense. Of course, for a sentence to be meaningful as a
component of de facto language use it is necessary for a speaker to have
knowledge of the truth conditions of a particular sentence.
But even this concession to the pragmatics of language is not enough since
such knowledge is unproblematic only if the assertoric sentences are carefully
chosen. As Habermas notes:
... the knowledge of truth conditions is, at most, unproblematic only
in the case of simple predicative observation sentences, whose
truth can be tested in easily surveyable contexts with the help of
readily accessible perceptual evidence. At any rate, there are no
correspondingly simple tests for predictions, counterfactual
conditional sentences, nomological statements, and so forth.
(Habermas 1998: 287)
No simple test equates to no simple knowledge of truth conditions and this
impairs any story about meaning based explicitly on knowledge of truth
conditions. Habermas then goes on to refer to Michael Dummett with approval
when Dummett notes that for a collection of sentences as those listed above:
... simple rules of verification for these [see quotation above] are
not at our disposal. It is therefore not sufficient to render the
Fregian thesis more precise to the effect that one understands an
assertoric sentence when one knows its rules of verification.
(Habermas 1998: 287)
Habermas then adopts Dummett’s suggestion that a move should be made
toward a broader condition that could prove more resilient and more useful in
explicating linguistic understanding when he refers to Dummett as:
Relying on the pragmatic distinction between truth and
"assertability" – that is between the truth of a sentence and the
entitlement to make an assertion with that sentence – Dummett
replaces knowledge of the truth conditions (or knowledge of the
verification rules of a justification game geared toward observation
situations) with indirect knowledge: the hearer must know the kinds
of reasons with which the speaker could, if necessary, vindicate his
claim that particular truth are satisfied. In short one understands an
assertoric sentence when one knows the kinds of reasons a
speaker must provide in order to convince a hearer that the
speaker is entitled to raise a truth claim for the sentence.
(Habermas 1998: 287 288).
This replacement of the knowledge of truth conditions with indirect knowledge
of the reasons a speaker could muster in support of their assertions has three
outcomes. First, it solves the shortcomings of formal semantics by broadening
the notion of what it means to understand the conditions under which an
assertion could be deemed true or false since the mere knowledge of truth
conditions is not sufficient to account for a robust linguistic competency that
encompasses a broad range of language use. Second, it incorporates the
pragmatics of language use in a fashion that sets it squarely apart from the
classical analytic tradition. Third, this transition from the standard analytical
outlook to a more inclusive perspective prepares us to see why Habermas’
validity claims play more than a mere communicative role in his theory and sets
the stage for showing what his theory of communicative action can contribute
to dialogues on the burden of proof.
5. Habermas on Communicative Action and Validity Claims
With Habermas' critique behind us let us turn to his theory of communicative
action. For Habermas "communicative action" refers to those forms of action
that are oriented towards achieving understanding. Understanding is achieved
according to Habermas when a hearer is in a position to take up a stance with
respect to what a speaker is saying. Based on Habermas’ critique above it
would not be unseemly to infer that such an understanding cannot occur in
exchanges that are limited simply to the exchange of syntactically well formed
utterances. Habermas' critique and the subsequent move toward a more
lenient condition that could account for meaning is what appears to underpin
Habermas’ standpoint regarding what it means to engage in communicative
action oriented towards achieving understanding. In a situation oriented
towards acting communicatively a hearer, in order to understand a speaker’s
utterance, needs to be in a position to where he or she can give their yea or
nay to a speaker’s statement. Conversely, a speaker, who wishes to engage in
communicative action, must stand ready to provide the grounds for a hearer to
take up such a stance if the need should arise.
This is where Habermas’ notion of a validity claim comes into play. As we
noted with Dummett’s contribution to Habermas’ critique above, in order to
understand a particular utterance issued by a speaker, a hearer needs to be
able to access the reasons or grounds that a speaker would (if asked) give in
support of this utterance. This anticipates a kind of "fiduciary" attitude on the
part of a speaker that if called upon to do so, he or she would be ready to
provide their hearer with these grounds.3 This implicit commitment to provide
grounds on the part of a speaker is called a validity claim by Habermas and all
statements of a communicative nature involve the implicit presence of validity
claims. (Habermas 1976: 52).
Taking a page from speech act theory Habermas singles out three main types
of speech action: constatives, regulatives and avowals. Each particular type
has its own theme that determines the type of validity claim that is incurred
when each one is employed by a speaker. Constatives are thematically related
to truth, regulatives are thematically related to rightness or appropriateness
and avowals are thematically related to truthfulness. (Habermas 1976: 58). By
invoking any one of these speech acts a speaker places him or her self under
what Habermas calls a "speech act immanent obligation" to make good on or
be ready to "redeem" (if necessary) these thematized validity claims.
(Habermas 1976: 63-65).
For example: in issuing the constative "John is a high school graduate" a
speaker is also implicitly advocating that the propositional content of this
statement is in fact the case. In this example the validity claim to "truth" is
emphasised. What makes this sound stranger than it is owes to the fact that in
the context of ordinary language use validity claims for the most part go
unchallenged and are for the most part inconspicuous. It is only when a
speaker and a hearer depart from a shared basis or background for
communication that breakdowns occur and validity claims become
problematic, thereby becoming the subject of attention in and of themselves or
becoming "thematized" as Habermas puts it. In such cases, communicative
action between speakers is suspended in favour of "theoretical discourse"
where particular validity claims are bracketed and theoretically examined in a
co-operative fashion in order to resolve the impasse and perhaps re-establish
communicative interaction between speaker and hearer. (Habermas 1976:
64).
This is where I want to stand in suggesting that Habermas has a significant
contribution to make in the ongoing conversation concerning how we ought to
understand the notion of the burden of proof. Although I have never come
across any reference in his works that explicitly relates the notion of the burden
of proof with his idea of validity claims, I think the proposal that these notions
ought to be identified with each other is not without merit. The most immediate
advantage being that Habermas' account stands ready to account for what I
have called the universal burden of proof outside the specific domain of
argumentation proper. The existence of such a universal burden leads me to
suspect that the burden of proof is more ubiquitous and more integral to
communication than the pragma-dialectical account leads us to believe. I am
inspired in this regard by Alfred Sidgwick, who wrote the following in his 1883
work on Fallacies:
Lastly, it follows that even he who asserts the most widely accepted
doctrine cannot escape the ‘burden’ of supporting it by reasons.
The burden of proof rests, for example, on those who maintain the
theory of gravitation or of the rotundity of the earth, just as truly as
on any one who should set up for his thesis the denial of either: the
difference is that in asserting such truths as these the burden is apt
to pass unnoticed, from the fact that the evidence is strong enough
to shift it easily, while in denying them the burden might really be felt
as a serious weight. (Sidgwick 1883: 154).
I think this intuition concerning the ubiquity of the burden of proof is more
profound than that provided by the narrow explication of the notion of the
burden of proof from the pragma-dialectical perspective. I am not convinced
that the normativity of this notion is essentially linked to argumentative success,
at least not in any deep sense. If, as I have argued, we identify the burden of
proof with Habermas’ notion of a validity claim, then we are at the beginning of
a view that moves in a very different direction. I think that explicating the burden
of proof along Habermasian lines can help account for the widespread role that
probative obligations appear to play in ordinary language. If we bear in mind
Habermas’ permeable division between the grammatical and the
communicative, we can even see the burden of proof as constituting (at least in
part) what it means to regard a speaker as linguistically competent.
For Habermas, unless something like a validity claim or burden of proof is
taken on by a speaker and presumed by a hearer, sentences capable of
conveying meanings cannot emerge as units of communication. This more
than anything, I think, gives us a sense of where the normative basis of the
burden of proof must be sought. Once this move is made, then (I am inclined to
speculate) more particular applications of the burden of proof could be
articulated. But, as I mentioned earlier, I think it is a mistake to let any particular
contextual description dictate how we ought to understand the burden of proof
and what sense of normativity we ought to attach to this notion.
6. Conclusion
This is where my proposal comes to an end, with the modest suggestion that
what renders the burden of proof normative for speakers is not exclusively (or
perhaps not even primarily) attributable to its role as part of a particular
pragmatic apparatus for argumentative success. Beneath this particular goal
lies a more universal requirement upon speakers to exercise semantic and
communicative competence at the most basic level of language use. Speakers
need to be both able and willing to place themselves under the speech act
immanent obligation to redeem their validity claims (to use Habermas'
terminology) or to discharge the commonplace burden of proof that incurs from
normal language use. Once this universal language requirement is satisfied,
then all kinds of language games can follow. Speakers can then decide on
which particular language games they wish to play and the specific
commitments they wish to place themselves under in order to participate in
them successfully. But at the heart of all this diverse linguistic activity it is this
more universal rendering of the burden of proof notion, more than any particular
pragmatic application of it, that makes the burden of proof a serious weight for
conscientious communicators both in and outside the domain of argumentation
to contend with.
Endnotes 
1Van Eemeren and Grootendorst attribute this criterion to Barth and Krabbe
(1982: 21-22).
2For Habermas an action (language use) is "communicative" when it is done
in order to achieve understanding. (Habermas 1976: 1).
3I am indebted to Michael Polayni for the legal metaphor. (Polanyi 1962: 28). 
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